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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
-v-
STEVEN V. SINGLETON 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 19107 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, STEVEN V. SINGLETON, appeals from his 
conviction of Theft, a Third Degree felony in the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Following trial by jury, the Court entered judgment 
of guilty of Count II of the Information, Theft, a Third Degree 
Felony and not guilty of Count I of the Information, Burglary, 
a Second Degree Felony. Defendant was ordered col!Ul1itted to the 
Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years and was fined Five Hundred ($500) Dollars. Defendant was 
granted a stay of execution of the above sentence and was placed 
on probation for a period of three years under the supervision 
of Adult Probation and Parole. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the lower court's conv.i ct ion 
reversed and to have the case remanded to the Third District 
Court for a new trial or have the matter dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 11, 1981, at about 7:15 p.m., witness 
Bailey was turning into her driveway when out of the corner 
of her eye, she saw movement west of her in an adjacent fieldo 
(T. 30). As she proceeded into the driveway, her lights flashed 
on a person who walked past her car. (T. 37). Her lights also 
hit on something shiney in the field. (T. 40). Bailey continued 
to watch the individual from her rearview mirror and when she was 
sure he wasn't around, she went into the area of the field where 
she had seen the object shine and found a stereoo (T. 41) 0 She 
then returned to her apartment and called the police< (T. 41) 0 
When the police arrived, they discovered a residence 
at 365 North Main had been burglarized. (T. 90). Besides the 
stereo equipment discovered by Bailey, a thirty-five millimeter 
camera, hard case, and telephoto lens had been taken from the 
residence. (T. 27). The camera equipment was never found< 
Bailey told the investigating officer that the individual 
she had seen was male white in his 20's, about five foot eight or 
ten, medium build, wearing a blue and white baseball cap, a blue 
jacket, and levis. (T. 93). The investigating officer called 
two motor officers in the area and gave them the description. 
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sometime around 9:00 p.m. (T. 42) the motor officers saw the 
appellant at about 603 North 200 West wearing levis, a blue 
nylon jacket and a blue and white baseball cap. (T. 123). 
After asking for and receiving Appellant's identification, 
(T. 128) the motor officers took Appellant to the Bailey residence 
for a "show up". The officers took the hand-cuffed Appellant 
across the street to stand under a street light, and from her 
porch steps Bailey identified him as the individual she had seen 
earlier in the evening. (T. 78-82). 
While en-route to the jail, Appellant stated to the 
transporting officer "I guess she saw me with the stereo 
equipment, too?". 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PROSECUTOR'S SOLICITATION OF TESTIMONY FROM 
POLICE OFFICER AS TO APPELLANT'S SILENCE AFTER 
RECEIVING THE MIRANDA WARNING VIOLATES APPELLANT'S 
FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
During trial, counsel for the State called Douglas Maack, 
a Salt Lake City Police officer to the stand. The prosecutor 
then elicited the following testimony: (T. 97-100). 
Q. After she made her identification of the 
individual, what did you do? 
A. I placed the individual back in my car and 
read him his rights. 
Q. What rights did you read? 
A: Miranda. 
Q. Did you read that from a card, or personally, 
or what? 
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A. From a card. 
Q. Did he indicate that he understood his riqhts? 
A. Yes sir, he did. 
Q. For the record, do you have the card with you? 
A. No, sir, I don't. 
Q. Can you remember what the card said, what the 
rights are that you gave? 
A. I always read it directly from a card. 
Q. Is that a standard-practice procedure card? 
A. Yes, sir, it is. 
Q. After reading that, did you ask him if he 
understood his rights? 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
Q. Did he respond? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. I can describe the card a little bit. Miranda 
is on the one side, and you turn it over and on the 
other side it asks if those are -- if they completely 
understand the Miranda that they have been given and 
if they wish to make a statement or talk to an 
attorney. 
Q. Did he respond to that question? 
A. He responded to both. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. He said he understood his rights and he said 
he really didn't have anything to say. 
MR. EBERT: Your Honor, I object and I reserve a 
motion. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
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MR. EBERT: Your Honor, I would ask to argue this 
right now. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. EBERT: Your Honor, I would like to argue it 
outside the presence of the jury. 
THE COURT: You will have an opportunity to do that. 
You may proceed with your questioning. 
MR. GUNNARSON: Thank you. 
Q. (By Mr. Gunnarson) Did he indicate he didn't 
want to talk to you? 
A. At that time he did, yes. 
Q. What exactly did he say? 
A. Something to the effect that he didn't have 
anything to say. 
Q. Did he say he had nothing to say, or that he 
didn't want to talk to you? 
A. Just that he didn't have anything to say. 
Appellant maintains that allowing testimony relating to 
the Appellant's exercise of his Constitutional right to remain 
silent was improper and prejudicial to the jury. Such improper 
conduct on the part of the State should entitle the Appellant to 
a new trial before a jury untainted by such prejudicial information. 
An accused in a criminal trial has the privilege against 
self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. The privilege 
is safeguarded in a police custodial interrogation by the mandate 
of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 431 (1966). The accused, in 
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exercise of the right against self-1ncr1m1nation, may remain 
silent and refuse to talk to police. An accused's silence 
may not later be used against him as evidence of his guilt. 
Id. at 384 U.S. 468, fn. 37. The United States Supreme Court 
has extended this principle to include questioning and comment 
on a defendant's failure to make a statement upon arrest, 
after Miranda warnings have been given. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 UoS. 
619 (1976). 
The policies to be served by a rule against prosecutorial 
comment on the accused's exercise of his right to remain silent 
have been recognized by the Utah Supreme court. In State v. 
Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (1981), this Court reversed the defendant's 
conviction on the basis that the prosecution attempted, more than 
once, to put the defendant's post-arrest silence before the jury. 
This court stated that references to Wiswell's post-arrest silence 
were "fundamental error which could have affected the result and 
[were] therefore prejudicial." 
In the present case, counsel objected to testimony 
that appellant remained silent after Miranda warnings. The 
objection was overruled and a subsequent defense motion for a 
mistrial was denied. By overruling counsel's objection, the trial 
court may have given the jury the impression that they could 
lawfully infer guilt from the Appellant's exercise of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege. 
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Further, testimony that the Appellant "had nothing to 
say" to police after Miranda was of no relevance or probative value 
to the substance of the State's case. The only possible purpose 
of allowing such testimony to reach the jury was to prejudice the 
accused and infer his guilt.cf. State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326 
(Utah 1980). 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF 
THE APPELLANT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
It is well settled that a reviewing court has 
the authority to review a conviction based upon sufficiency 
of the evidence. The standard for review was clearly stated in 
State v. Wilson, 565 P. 2d 66 (1977): 
In order for the defendant to successfully 
challenge and overturn a verdict on the 
ground of insufficiency of the evidence, 
it must appear that upon so viewing the 
evidence, reasonable minds must necessarily 
entertain a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime . .565 P.2d 68, 
See Also State v. Forte, 572 P.2d 1387. 
In State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (1975), this court 
also addressed when sufficiency of the evidence must be challenged: 
For a defendant to prevail upon a challenge 
to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain 
his conviction, it must appear that viewing 
the evidence and all inferences that may 
reasonably be drawn therefrom, in the light 
most favorable to the verdict of the jury, 
reasonable minds could not believe him 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 P.2d at 
127 2. 
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In the present case, Appellant maintains the evidence 
presented by the State was insufficient to support a verdict of 
guilt of Theft beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The identification of Appellant as the man Bailey saw 
next to stereo equipment in the field was based upon a 15 to 
20 second observation which occurred at night. (T. 59). 
The description Bailey gave to the police was a general 
one which presumably could have fit a number of young men on the 
streets in November; male in his 20's, dressed in levis and 
levi jacket with a blue and white baseball cap. (T. 93). 
Further, Bailey's identification of Appellant nearly two hours 
later occurs while the accused was in police custody, handcuffed 
and with the illumination of only a street light. (T. 78-82). 
Such circumstances should have created doubt that Bailey's 
identification was a valid one. 
Even if the jury could have believed beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Appellant was the individual Bailey saw 
next to the property in the field, the State presented no evidence 
that Appellant was the individual who had stolen the property. 
The mere presence of an individual at the scene of a crime, should 
not be sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
That the jury split its verdict and found appellant not 
guilty of the Burglary but guilty of the Theft cannot be over-
looked. There was no evidence that the Appellant had the requisite 
intent to commit a theft, unless the jury believed not only that 
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Appellant was the man Bailey saw near the stereo equipment, 
but that Appellant was also the burglar who had taken the property 
from the victim residence. The jury's acquittal of the underlying 
burglary charge indicates the probability that the jury was not 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt and 
instead of acquitting, split the 
Appellant respectfully submits that the State failed to 
establish his guilt of the crime of Theft beyond a reasonable 
doubt and asks that his conviction be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed reversible error in 
allowing Appellant's post-arrest silence to be brought into 
evidence. Further, evidence presented by the State was 
insufficient to establish the Appellant's guilt of Theft beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
For these reasons, 
conviction be reversed. 
DATED this )7.. .. ,-> 
( 
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DELIVERED two copies of the foreqoinq to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84114, this -.!..3._day of April, 1984. 
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